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On September 29, 1938, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State George S. Messersmith wrote a prescient letter to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius on the dangers of appeasing Germany. With the Trump Administration planning to engage Russia in Saudi Arabia, perhaps in coming days, the dangers of Appeasement are again relevant. In general, history has revealed that (1) the appeasement of aggressors delays but does not prevent conflict and (2) short-term political decisions have long-term consequences.
In his letter, Messersmith wrote:
The fear of war has grown into a hysteria and there is grave danger that in the face of the tension and psychology prevailing in Europe today and elsewhere preliminary arrangements and promises may be made at Munich in the next few days which, if carried through, will either make Germany the master of Europe and of a good part of the world eventually—with all that that involves for others and ourselves, or a war will be made inevitable. If arrangements are made at Munich now or in a general conference elsewhere later which are a cynical sellout of principle—just to avoid a war, and if Hitler will get promises of economic help, which he is certain to ask for, it will mean that the present Government in Germany will be solidified in power, given permanence and means to exist and fatten, and then through the avoidance of war now we should only have put Germany in a position to carry through successfully the war which she intends to fight and which she is not in a position to wage successfully now…
If the powers meeting at Munich, or which will meet later at some other place, will be only dominated by this fear of war and the desire to avert it at any price, then arrangements will be made, whether we sit in or not, which will have the most far-reaching consequences for us not only in our political relations with other states but in our economic relationships and the repercussions on our internal situation, political and economic, will be far-reaching… Our relationships with practically every state outside of this hemisphere will become more difficult. Our problems in a good part of this hemisphere, which are already difficult, will become acute. We shall ourselves eventually be faced by war which will become just as imminent a threat as that which has faced Europe in the last days…
I put forward that it is not realistic to assume that with the gaining of its now proclaimed objectives in Czechoslovakia, Germany will be satisfied so far as her territorial objectives are concerned. Only a year ago the German Government said just as definitely that it had no objective in Austria affecting the sovereignty of Austria. Until less than six months ago the present Government in Germany said that it had no objectives in Czechoslovakia affecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity but only wished to assure decent treatment of minorities. I will not go over the long record, but I think we must view the last Hitler pronouncement realistically and in the light of the known facts and with the realization that with Germany made stronger now, it is inevitable that the progress towards territorial expansion will continue…
Messersmith’s observations apply to Vladimir Putin’s Russia today. Danger lurks.
