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The Israeli strikes carried out beginning on Thursday night on Iran’s strategic military sites, senior military leadership, key nuclear scientists, and the Natanz nuclear facility were stunning in scope and execution. These operations followed closely on the heels of the IAEA’s declaration that Iran was in violation of its nuclear obligations, as well as public vows from Tehran to accelerate its nuclear program.
In my view, this chain of events might never have unfolded had President Trump not unilaterally withdrawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That decision arguably dismantled the most plausible path toward a peaceful resolution with Iran. Actions have consequences. In geopolitics, those consequences often unfold over years, if not longer.
Looking ahead, a range of scenarios is possible. Iran’s capacity to launch wide-scale attacks on Israel or U.S. regional bases appears limited, even as Iran can still inflict painful damage with its still large stockpile of ballistic missiles. Any large-scale Iranian attack on American regional bases would likely provoke direct U.S. military involvement at a time when Iran’s air defenses are largely in ruins. Tehran’s repeated threat to close the Strait of Hormuz is now less credible.
A plausible medium-term strategic outcome could involve a sizable shift in the regional balance of power. Under this scenario, Israel’s position as the dominant military and strategic force in the Middle East would be strengthened. Iran’s status as a major power would be diminished, creating opportunities for Sunni-led states like Saudi Arabia to further assert their regional influence. Iraq, long caught in Tehran’s orbit, may begin to reassert its independence with the passage of time. Lebanon might be able to further break out of Hezbollah’s once suffocating stranglehold. Iran’s network of proxies, already battered, could be further marginalized. Even the Houthis’ position in Yemen could weaken, possibly shifting the balance in that shattered country’s ongoing civil war.
The implications extend beyond the Middle East. A weakened Iran may reduce its military support to Russia, particularly its supply of drones for use in Ukraine. Indeed, even if Iran wanted to continue to provide drones to Russia, its drone production capacity could be badly damaged. More significantly, with Iran destabilized and Syria under new leadership, Russia’s overall destabilizing influence in the region could erode further. Russia’s retreat could create new fertile ground for productive diplomacy.
Over the longer term, the regime in Tehran may struggle to maintain its grip on the population. If the Israeli strikes substantially degrade the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s oppressed popular pro-democracy movement might re-ignite. Public frustration remains high beneath the surface, especially with fairly recent abuses carried out against young Iranian women. Even if the clerical regime is forced to cede some of its power or is swept aside, immediate rapprochement with Israel or the United States is unlikely. Overall, this internal transformation remains a lower-probability scenario than a straightforward shift in regional power dynamics. External military shocks don’t have a great record of producing immediate internal reform. In cases, radical, illiberal, or extreme groups emerge to fill power vacuums.
These are initial thoughts on a rapidly evolving situation. This assessment is by no means comprehensive. Alternative scenarios exist.
